BRICS Expansion: Implications for Outer Space

DOI: 10.58867/PJBU1229

In January 2024, the BRICS group doubled in membership, drawing attention to its policies and role in global governance.[1] While the group’s enlargement is a significant step in its development, it has also raised new questions about challenging key aspects of U.S. global leadership and the deepening of bloc politics. The BRICS group’s finance initiatives and efforts to shift away from the dollar have received extensive attention. However, policy analysts have largely overlooked an area where BRICS is increasingly competing with Western, and especially U.S., efforts to build a security governance and technology cooperation system in a key domain for the 21^st century: outer space. 

The importance of investigating the BRICS group’s activities in this domain lies in the fact that space has been one of the most successful issues of BRICS policy convergence, as per the BRICS Convergence Index,[2] and it is also central to geopolitics. China and Russia have been championing the group’s cooperation in outer space issues during their BRICS presidencies. The BRICS countries’ joint stance on space security governance is to support the Sino-Russian Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT).[3] Other programs include developing technology cooperation initiatives and coordinating bodies, especially around a remote sensing satellite constellation and a global telescope network. Moreover, all new members have interests in space, and new regulatory frameworks are being negotiated as civilian and commercial space initiatives proliferate.

What are the implications of the BRICS expansion – will it enhance Sino-Russian space ambitions in the group, and how will it affect the United States? This article explores the evolving nature of BRICS space governance and technology cooperation. It contends that while China and Russia’s space campaign is likely to benefit from BRICS enlargement, there are opportunities for the U.S. to launch new initiatives to reduce the risk of conflict in space and broaden equitable access to space technologies.

The next section examines the growth of BRICS space cooperation. After that, we analyze whether China and Russia’s space ambitions find fertile ground in the new BRICS countries and strengthen their leverage to advance their preferred norms. The article concludes by exploring U.S. responses to this growing BRICS space challenge, and areas for cooperation with BRICS and Global South states to promote their space ambitions and involvement in building a space security regime without the downsides of the Sino-Russian approach.

The Ascent of BRICS Cooperation on Outer Space

BRICS space arms control and technology cooperation has been a significant element of the group’s activities since 2014, and it is only gaining momentum. In 2014, BRICS declared its support for the PPWT treaty, and began collaborating on remote sensing satellite observation and data-sharing under China’s 2017 presidency.[4] The 2021 Cooperation on BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation agreement formalized this initiative, integrating existing satellites from each state, while preserving national autonomy over the volume and sensitivity of data shared with BRICS partners.[5] A year later, the BRICS countries launched the Joint Committee on Space Cooperation, a new coordinating body for these efforts.[6]They have also established an Astronomy Working Group, which has been developing an optical transient telescope network and associated data processing systems for global sky monitoring since 2015.[7]

Growing BRICS-level space technology cooperation is being matched by resilient PPWT support. A recently published BRICS Convergence Index, which examined BRICS policy convergence between 2009 and 2021, found that BRICS support for the PPWT has been consistently expressed since 2014  the same year that Russia and China introduced a revised legally-binding PPWT draft at the UN.[8] The PPWT treaty has been the centerpiece of Sino-Russian space governance diplomacy, challenging U.S. and Western approaches to space governance.

The U.S. and Western states criticize the design of the PPWT for omitting mechanisms to verify compliance, while permitting kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) tests and open-ended development and deployment of ASAT systems.[9] An important concern is that ASAT tests generate substantial and long-lasting debris that threatens the space missions and capabilities of all countries.[10] The treaty would also allow the development of weapons on Earth that can be put into space, and the continued operation of offensive space military platforms.[11] By contrast, Western capitals generally favor a legally-binding space arms control treaty in the long-term. Still, they prioritize starting with transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) to build trust and consensus.[12]

China and Russia have argued that the U.S. seeks to militarize space. They raised concerns about its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the threats to their nuclear deterrents, U.S. counterspace capabilities, and using U.S. satellites for spying.[13] In 2015, they successfully mobilized BRICS to block an alternative EU-sponsored International Code of Conduct establishing norms against damage and destruction of space objects.[14] Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China and Russia have remained committed to aligning their foreign and security policies, including increasing intransigence on space militarization and non-PPWT arms control approaches. In 2022, a Russian official warned the UN that “quasi-civilian” satellites assisting Ukraine could be legitimate targets for Russia,[15] while a Chinese statement criticized perceived bad-faith motives and policies of “a certain superpower” in stalling PPWT progress.[16]

While Sino-Russian and Western differences on space governance policy deepen, the growth of BRICS as a security cooperation group creates new opportunities for Beijing and Moscow to establish greater influence over its space governance and technology cooperation. We next explore the extent of Sino-Russian success in this regard, before highlighting potential responses for U.S. policymakers. 

Can the Expanded BRICS Facilitate Sino-Russian Space Ambitions? 

Brazil’s space policy orientation has been dependent on its leadership. Under President Bolsanaro, Brazil adopted a pro-Western space orientation, successfully campaigning for admission to the U.S.-led Artemis space exploration and governance consortium in 2021.[17] This was a change from Brazil’s past preference for cooperating with China on a remote satellite sensing system,[18] with Russia on rocket and satellite development,[19] and establishing GLONASS (Russia’s equivalent to GPS) ground monitoring stations on Brazilian soil.[20] However, President Lula reprioritized the BRICS alignment in Brazil’s foreign policy.[21] Brazil’s demand for satellite-based synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology led to China providing this technology through the new China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite Program (CBERS) satellite, CBERS-6, which China and Brazil equally funded. Although CBERS-6 ostensibly intends to monitor the Amazon, climate, and agriculture,[22] its technology could also aid Chinese monitoring of regional U.S. force movements and enable China to embed its technologies within Brazil’s space program.[23] The joint China-Brazil statement on CBERS-6 stressed that “the peaceful use of outer space (…) must have international law as its basis,”[24]hinting at a shared Sino-Russian preference for fast-tracking a binding arms control treaty similar to the PPWT. In 2023, Brazil also engaged in discussions with Russia about a potential bilateral “full-fledged design, production, and technological alliance,” [25] defense cooperation,[26] and space arms control, signaling a renewed interest in Sino-Russian space cooperation.[27]

South Africa lacks an indigenous space launch capability, and has variably partnered with the European Space Agency, U.S., Russia, and India to launch its satellites.[28] While Russia developed and launched a “Condor-E2” military surveillance satellite for South Africa in 2014, Moscow’s involvement in a more recent French-South African “ZACube2” maritime domain awareness satellite was reduced to only launching the system in 2018.[29] Engineers trained by the French South African Institute of Technology were part of the core team that designed and launched three additional maritime awareness satellites from Cape Canaveral in 2022.[30] In space governance, South Africa, like China and Russia, prioritizes finalization of a legally binding treaty over an approach based on normative consensus and TCBMs.[31]

India’s space approaches contrast with those of the other BRICS members in terms of its cooperation with the United States. India’s civilian space sector principally uses indigenous technologies, and New Delhi has multiple civilian space cooperation and situational awareness agreements with the U.S. and the Quad.[32] Many Indian space initiatives are implicitly or explicitly directed against China, as its foremost geopolitical rival.[33] Meanwhile, India has emerged as a leading international civilian space launch provider, capturing market share from Russia.[34] A new U.S.-India agreement may replace Russia as India's historical provider of astronaut training.[35] Moreover, the NASA-Indian Space Research Organisation NISAR SAR technology cooperation project positions the U.S. as a key partner in providing India with sophisticated SAR systems and operating experience.[36] The U.S. is helping India to develop its own space sector, while limiting opportunities for Russia and China as technology suppliers.

Egypt and Ethiopia have benefited from China’s early support for their space programs. Beijing has almost solely financed Ethiopia’s nascent space program, supplying and launching satellites on Ethiopia’s behalf. While there are plans for increased use of Ethiopian technology, Addis Ababa will likely continue to rely on Chinese platforms.[37] China also provides financial and technical assistance to Egypt to develop a Space Center to co-develop and launch satellites.[38]Additionally, Russia has launched three satellites for Egypt and is exploring potential space technology cooperation with both Ethiopia and Egypt.[39] Regarding governance, Egypt regularly proposes resolutions at UN General Assembly sessions to advocate for a legally binding treaty on disarmament, possibly based on the PPWT. Its statements emphasize that TCBMs alone are not enough, echoing the Sino-Russian position.[40] Ethiopia has also urged international consensus to prevent an arms race in space to avoid harming smaller states’ developmental needs.[41]

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are diversifying their international technology partners for their space programs. In 2023, Saudi Arabia sent its first manned spaceflight program to the International Space Station under a SpaceX launch contractfrom Cape Canaveral. Still, it remains open to both cooperation partners and initiatives in the future.[42] China launchedtwo Saudi indigenous earth observation satellites in 2018.[43] The more advanced UAE program has also engaged various partners, including agreeing for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to launch its recent Mars probe from Japan.[44] This comes after Saudi Arabia chose Russia to launch its first indigenous satellite in 2018 and hired Boeing, EADS, and South Korea’s Satrec Initiative to build earlier satellites.[45] Saudi Arabia has sided with BRICS states in space governance, seeking a binding treaty. By contrast, the UAE’s space security diplomacy aligns more with the U.S. advocating for TCBMs as the initial step for UN states.[46]

Iran is arguably the BRICS member most inclined towards cooperating with China and Russia in space technology and arms control. In 2022, Russia constructed and launched the first of four planned Iranian remote-sensing satellites. Additionally, Russia is reportedly constructing a geostationary communications satellite with limited SAR capabilities, enhancing Iranian military surveillance.[47] Iran also recently launched an imaging satellite from a civilian spaceport northeast of Tehran.[48] Regarding space governance, Iran openly doubts the effectiveness of TCBMs and calls for a legally binding treaty based on the PPWT. Alongside China and Russia, Iran criticizes Starlink as destabilizing to international security and condemns the U.S. for conducting direct-ascent ASAT tests.[49]

Overall, the expanded BRICS is not likely to significantly facilitate Sino-Russian space ambitions in the short term. While Iran is the strongest supporter of their ambitions, other member states are divided concerning their preferred providers of space technologies and governance preferences. That said, both China and Russia have made significant moves to meet the needs of the group's other members, enabling them to use their leverage to elicit greater support for the PPWT treaty. At the same time, the expanded BRICS presents an opportunity for U.S. policy development in outer space. 

U.S. Policies in Outer Space and Possible Responses 

U.S. policy clearly articulates the threat of China and Russia in space. The 2022 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency “Challenges to Security in Space” report suggests that China and Russia are challenging U.S. security in space by expanding space operations, Earth-focused space services, and intended explorations of the moon and beyond.[50]Similarly, the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy warns that their space activities threaten U.S. military operations, critical infrastructure, and the space-based systems that support “daily civilian life.”[51] The more recent 2023 U.S. Strategic Framework for Space Diplomacy remarks that “New, emerging space partners balance space relationships with us and our strategic competitors. Some governments may not recognize the vulnerabilities of increased intermingling with competitors’ space industries.”[52]

The Artemis Accords is a principal U.S. space exploration and governance cooperation initiative, which the U.S. promotes as an example of its global coalition-building. Joining the agreement itself is non-binding, and signatories reaffirm the principles of the Outer Space Treaty while supporting new norms of “interoperability, the deconfliction of activities, protection of lunar heritage, and obligations addressing orbital debris and spacecraft disposal.” Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are the only BRICS states that are also Artemis signatories.[53] However, the policy divergence between Gulf monarchy Artemis members Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and across BRICS states more broadly, highlights the limited value of the initiative in shaping member state preferences. 

A second form of U.S. space engagement is through the proliferation of commercial space companies, which serve as price-competitive launch and technology partners with access to world-leading American space launchpads. The 2023 U.S. Strategic Framework for Space Diplomacy commits the U.S. government to promoting new market opportunities for these private firms. However, Russia and China have been able to influence these companies to deviate from Washington’s preferences. For example, the Russian Ambassador to the U.S. reportedly persuaded Elon Musk, SpaceX’s CEO, to restrict Ukrainian access to the company’s Starlink satellite system over Crimea, asserting that its use could lead to significant – and potentially nuclear – escalation.[54] Musk also accepted Beijing’s request to ban Starlink access in China. International analysts and Taiwanese officials believe that Beijing has leverage over Musk because Tesla, his car company, heavily relies on China-based manufacturing facilities.[55] Rather than expanding NASA's capacity, reliance on the commercial space sector undermines U.S. efforts to address Chinese and Russian challenges in space technology cooperation.

The Strategic Framework for Space Diplomacy recognizes the inextricable link between space technology cooperation and success in space security governance. However, aside from the Artemis Accords and new U.S. commercial space contracts, it remains unclear how the U.S. will build out the capacity to compete effectively with China and Russia. In particular, the real under-resourcing of U.S. government civil space cooperation – as a more reliable mechanism of U.S. space and strategic policy influence than commercial contracts – is inadvertently highlighted in the challenges of meeting a Framework goal to “facilitate new market opportunities for U.S. commercial space capabilities and services, including civil applications that rely on USG-provided space systems.”[56]

The U.S. GPS system is a leading example of such a U.S. government-provided service. However, recent researchsuggests that the Chinese BeiDou rival system now has the largest number of satellite ground stations outside of its territory. The Chinese investment affects comparative global data availability, as “BeiDou satellites are more frequently observed than GPS satellites in 130 of 195 United Nations member countries.”[57] For example, while Ethiopia relies more on BeiDou than GPS for civilian applications due to its stronger signal, South Africa has formalized its use of BeiDou, and China is engaging with Brazil, Egypt, and UAE on BeiDou cooperation.[58] China has granted Saudi Arabia and Iran access to BeiDou’s military communications and positioning services, while it is working with Russia on interoperability with Moscow’s similar GLONASS system.[59]

Competition and Cooperation in Space?

The Russian 2024 BRICS Presidency lists promoting cooperation in science and high technology among its priorities, suggesting that space cooperation will likely remain an important area of policy coordination.[60] BRICS expansion means that the new members need to be socialized into the BRICS group’s agendas, and they are now being integrated into various working groups. However, it is also important to note that the Russian BRICS presidency seeks to offer engagement opportunities to a large number of states that applied to join BRICS. Namely, President Putin indicated that BRICS will consider the preparedness of around 30 other countries “to join the BRICS multidimensional agenda in one form or another.”[61] Thus, Russia – together with China – can use the presidency to mobilize a broader group of countries around their space priorities.

If the United States wants to exert leadership in space technology cooperation and governance, it needs to elevate space challenges in its policy development and in parallel, work on a robust U.S. BRICS policy that engages the development needs of the Global South. There is geopolitical room for a greater U.S. role in engaging some old and new BRICS states on space technology cooperation and approaches to outer space governance. This can be done within the Strategic Framework for Space Diplomacy, focusing on BRICS states outside China, Russia, and Iran, as well as Global South states indicating interest in space programs. A U.S. government civil initiative to provide low-cost access to sophisticated space technology and launch services to these states – while complying with Missile Technology Control Regime restrictions – could reduce demand for alternative Sino-Russian cooperation packages. The long-term U.S. space strategy should prioritize the rebuilding of capacity in the public space sector over commercial ventures. This is essential to ensure that the differing interests of domestic and commercial actors do not compromise U.S. strategic goals.

The developments analyzed in this article illustrate the interconnectedness of space technology cooperation and diplomacy on space security governance but also the challenge of ensuring meaningful progress on responsible norms of space behavior – a key security and sustainable development issue for the whole world. If the China-Russia PPWT campaign gains further ground across BRICS, the deepening of bloc politics is making collective action at the global level unlikely. In turn, the downsides of the PPWT – its inability to prevent weaponization of space and prevent debris – can lead to a tragedy of the commons. Thus, it is timely for the U.S. to reenergize its space policy while being open to a potential legally binding agreement, bridging the Sino-Russian demand for such a document with the imperative to ensure its contents safeguard outer space for all.